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RELIGION, ETHICAL COMMUNITY AND THE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST EVIL 
Allen Wood 
This paper deals with the motivation behind Kant's conception of "religion" 
as "the recognition of all our duties as divine commands". It argues that in 
order to understand this motivation, we must grasp Kant's conception of 
radical evil as social in origin, and the response to it as equally social - the 
creation of a voluntary, universal "ethical community". Kant's historical 
model for this community is a religious community (especially the 
Christian church), though Kant regards traditional churches or religious 
communities as suitable to their moral vocation only if they undergo 
Enlightenment reform. The paper concludes with a plea for the 
Enlightenment view of religion, and an indictment of the common failure to 
understand it correctly. 
Religion and subjectivity. In Part Four of Religion Within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason, Kant states his more or less official definition of 'religion': 
"Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as 
divine commands" (Ak 6:153; cf. 6:443).1 To be religious, for Kant, is to 
view all one's duties as commands issued to one by God. Kant's wording 
of this definition, apparently restricting the definition to religion "subjec-
tively considered", might suggest that there could be another, "objective" 
way of considering religion, and this "objective religion" might have a dif-
ferent definition. But in fact Kant never offers a definition of that sort. In 
fact, Kant had already put forward this same official definition in Part 
Three in the following words: "Religion is the moral disposition 
(Gesinnung) to observe all duties as [God's] commands" (Ak 6:105). There 
is no suggestion here that this is a definition only of one kind of religion, to 
which another kind might be opposed. Instead, there is only a further 
emphasis on the subjectivity of all religion (as consisting in a special kind 
of "moral disposition"). A reasonable (and I think correct) inference from 
these facts is that Kant, like Kierkegaard, regards all religion as entirely a 
matter of "subjectivity". It has to do with one's way of regarding one's 
duties, and with one's moral disposition or attitude in fulfilling duties. 
Religiousness, then, is solely a matter of a person's subjective attitude 
toward the moral life. A moral agent is religious if she associates her moral 
duties with the thought that they are commanded by God, and observes 
her duties in that spirit. She might do this, for instance, by thinking about 
the moral life in terms of her personal relationship with God. Thus she 
might think of her moral transgressions as troubling that relationship, and 
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her resolve to do better in the future as an attempt to repair that relation-
ship, by giving God a reason to forgive her. This clearly is the way Kant 
represents the moral life of the individual in Part Two of the Religion, 
which dealt with "the battle of the good against the evil principle for 
dominion over the human being" by invoking Kantian interpretations of 
the traditional Christian doctrine of justification (Ak 6:66-84). 
The idea that religion for Kant is an entirely "subjective" matter may, 
however, also give rise to the thought that he regards it as an entirely 
optional matter whether one regards one's duties as divine commands. 
This is certainly true in the sense that Kant, as a strongly convinced politi-
cal liberal about all religious matters, thinks that it would be a basic viola-
tion of right to compel anyone to regard them in this way, as when people 
are forced to participate in religious services or make confession of a reli-
gious creed. It would be even more repugnant if they were forcibly made 
to think about their moral duties as commands of God. 
But the "subjectivity" of religion for Kant might also be taken to imply 
Kant regards it as in general a matter of moral indifference whether one 
thinks about one's moral life religiously or not: that there is nothing in 
rational morality itself that might justify or even provide strong moral rea-
sons for looking at one's moral life in a religious light. It might also be 
interpreted to mean that for Kant religion is entirely an individual matter-
that "religion" has to do solely with the way people, when they happen to 
be so disposed, choose to think privately about their personal duties. On 
this account, Kant's conception of religion would be both "liberal" and 
"Protestant" in the extreme - it would consist solely a matter of the wholly 
optional private thoughts and feelings individuals might have about their 
duties. Nothing people might do outwardly or collectively could have any-
thing distinctively "religious" about it, since for religion to have that sort of 
existence would be to make it into something "objective", which would be 
foreign or even inimical to the nature of religion as Kant conceives it. The 
interpretation might be reinforced by noting that Kant found formal reli-
gious creeds morally objectionable and regarded religious services as 
"counterfeit service of God"; he himself always refused on principle to par-
ticipate in religious services of any kind, even when such participation was 
(at least an informal) component of his duties as rector of the University of 
Konigsberg. It might lead to the further thought that Kant's insistence on 
the "subjectivity" of religion might really represent a desire on his part to 
exclude religion altogether from human life, and certainly to exclude it 
from the collective or shared life of human society. 
It is my purpose in this paper to show that the interpretation of Kant's 
conception of religion described in the last paragraph is mistaken. By this I 
do not mean only that it is exaggerated or one-sided, but rather that it is 
fundamentally wrong. It is a basic and not a marginal misinterpretation of 
Kantian ethics to regard religion even as incidental to rational morality 
(much less as morally superfluous or undesirable). It is the very reverse of 
the truth to interpret Kant's emphasis on the "subjectivity" of religion and 
his insistence that religious activities must always be voluntary, never 
coerced, to mean that he regards religion as properly a private rather than 
a public thing. Probably the deepest error of all is to think that because 
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Kant disapproved of creeds and traditional religious rituals, he must have 
regarded public or organized religion as of doubtful or negative value. For 
this is to impose on an eighteenth century thinker our twentieth century 
prejudices about what religion is, then letting these prejudices constrain 
what we take that thinker's options consist in, and consequently forcing on 
him a choice he would not have made. It is rather like saying of the ancient 
Israelites (as some of their shortsighted contemporaries might have said) 
that because they disapproved of the worship of idols, they must therefore 
have been atheists. 
Why should my duties be regarded as God's commands? The right 
place to begin our inquiry, I think, is with the question: Why does Kant 
think moral agents might choose subjectively to regard their duties as 
divine commands? Obviously this cannot be because this way of regarding 
them plays any role in determining the ground of obligation. For Kant is 
emphatic that "theological morality" (or divine command theory) cannot 
give us a satisfactory account of the categorical obligation attaching to 
duty. Taken in one way, divine command theory is a theory of heterono-
my, which must rest obligation on a contingent volition (e.g. of our love or 
our fear of God), thus undermining the categorical character of obligation 
(Ak 4:443, 5:40-41). On a more sympathetic interpretation of divine com-
mand theory, this theory regards God's commands as obligatory because it 
is contained in our rational concept of God that God has a perfect will, 
hence that he necessarily wills all and only that which is in itself right (i.e. 
categorically obligatory). But of course this still does not explain why 
God's perfect volitions should have to us the determinate character of com-
mands. Even if we solved that problem, however, we would still need an 
account of what categorical obligation consists in; only a theory of autono-
my of the will, and not divine command theory, will suffice for a satisfacto-
ry account of obligation. 
For this reason, thinking of our duties as divine commands cannot 
playa role in the proper motivation for doing our duty. On the contrary, the 
only pure motive for doing our duties is the motive of duty itself, or, as 
Kant restates this motive in the Groundwork, the worth of rational nature in 
the person of the finite rational being to whom we owe the duty (Ak 4:427-
429). God himself, as a being with a pure will, must will that we should 
perform our duties from this motive rather than, say, from fear of his 
power or hope of his favor; for either of these motives would compromise 
the autonomy of our will, something a good God could not will that we do. 
Just as little could the thought that our duties are divine commands 
play any role in determining the content of duties. For he holds that we 
have no special duties to God (Ak 6:443-444). Nor could our acquaintance 
with duty come from any special divine revelation. We can have no empir-
ical acquaintance with any being corresponding to our concept of God, 
since this concept is an idea of reason to which no experience could ever be 
adequate. Instead, things must work just the other way round; our only 
possible acquaintance with what God wills or commands must come from 
our rational awareness of the content of duty, and the thought that God, as 
a supremely perfect being, must necessarily will that our duties be per-
formed. 
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Kant does not even think that we have to believe that there really is a 
God who wills that we perform our duties. Even a religious person, who 
regards her duties as divine commands, need not be certain that her duties 
are in fact commanded by God. For religion, Kant says, "no assertoric 
knowledge (even of God's existence) is required, [but] only a problematic 
assumption (hypothesis) as regards speculation about the supreme cause 
of things;" the "faith" that is strictly indispensable to religion "needs mere-
ly the idea of God .. . only the minimum cognition (it is possible that there is a 
God) has to be objectively sufficient" (Ak 6:153-154). To be religious, then, 
I do not even have to believe in the existence of God. Religion requires that 
I have duties, that I have a concept of God (as a possible supreme cause of 
things), and that my awareness of duty is subjectively enlivened by the 
thought that if there is a God, then my duties are God's commands. We are 
still trying to find out, however, why Kant thought that a moral agent -
even one who is agnostic about God's existence - might have a good rea-
son subjectively to regard her duties as divine commands. 
Kant's most explicit answer to our question consists in appealing to 
our pursuit of the highest good (summum bonum), and our need to conceive 
this pursuit in relation to the will of God. The highest good requires, name-
ly, a correspondence of happiness to worthiness to be happy, and Kant 
famously maintains that we can conceive of such a correspondence only by 
supposing that the world is governed by a being that is omniscient (so as to 
know our worthiness to be happy), omnipotent (so as to be able to grant 
happiness in proportion to worthiness) and perfectly good (so that it wills, 
both justly and benevolently, that beings who have made themselves wor-
thy of happiness should partake in it). Accordingly, Kant answers our 
question as follows: "[Our duties] must be regarded as commands of the 
supreme being because we can hope for the highest good ... only from a 
morally perfect. .. will, and therefore we can hope to attain only through 
harmony with this will" (Ak 5:129). 
This answer, however, is highly unsatisfactory, or at least incomplete, 
and for at least three reasons. First, it seems to appeal to Kant's moral 
arguments for believing in the existence of God (as the sole way of conceiv-
ing the possible reality of the highest good); it therefore fails to explain 
why Kant might suppose that even someone who is agnostic about God's 
existence might nevertheless regard her duties as divine commands. 
Second, although we may hope to attain the highest good only if our will is 
in harmony with God's will, it has not yet been explained why we should 
think of this harmony specifically as our obedience to commands issued by 
God's will. Third, even if we ignore these problems, however, the answer 
is still incomplete in that it merely shifts our attention to another big ques-
tion we may have about Kantian ethics: Why in any case do we have to 
regard the highest good as a necessary object of our pursuit? 
This is also the point at which to articulate another worry we may 
have about Kant's entire account of religion, as we have seen it so far. This 
account seems legalistic in a way that is probably unappealing to most of 
us, and may even seem inconsistent with certain parts of Kant's own doc-
trines. As an object of religious attitudes, God seems to be conceived exclu-
sively as a moral legislator, a powerful holy being who issues commands. 
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As religious people, our subjective attitude toward God seems to be that of 
the subject of a cosmic monarch, to whose will we are supposed to con-
form in order to attain the highest good (that is, to obtain the happiness of 
which our conduct has made us worthy). It must be admitted, of course, 
that this way of representing God, as a cosmic lawgiver, and of our love to 
him, as obedience to his commands, is quite traditional - it is basic to much 
theology in both the medieval and early modern periods. Yet Kant's theory 
of moral obligation as grounded on autonomy seemed attractive precisely 
because it distanced itself from this picture, repudiating the divine com-
mand moralist's conception of obligation as based on cringing obedience to 
the orders of a cosmic despot and regarding moral agents instead as self-
governing rational beings, who are bound to the moral law by their sense 
of their own dignity as self-legislators. 
My thesis will be that there is a solution to all these problems, consist-
ing in the fundamental role played in Kant's conception of religion by the 
idea of an ethical community. 
Evil and sociability. But our route to this solution must take yet anoth-
er apparent detour, through Kant's doctrine of the radical evil in human 
nature. Kant holds that two sorts of incentives present themselves to the 
human will: incentives of inclination, referring to our natural desires, and 
incentives of reason, referring to our dignity as self-governing rational 
agents; the latter incentives always have rational priority over the former, 
especially when these rational incentives take the form of categorically 
valid moral imperatives. Yet Kant also holds that we find in human beings 
an innate propensity to invert the rational order of these incentives, prefer-
ring incentives of inclination over those of reason, choosing the satisfaction 
of empirical desires over the rational commands of duty (Ak 6:36-39). The 
human being, in his view, is an animal rationabilis, an animal capable of rea-
son, but not an animal rationale, a being in which this capacity is typically 
exercised successfully (Ak 7:321-322). 
Kant calls this propensity the "radical" evil in human nature, because 
it lies at the root of all the particular evil we do. It shows itself not only 
directly in the form of "depravity" - the direct preference of natural desires 
over rational principles - but also in the two lesser degrees of "fragility" 
(the tendency not to abide by good maxims we have adopted) and "impu-
rity" (the need for empirical incentives in order to do what reason com-
mands) (Ak 6:29-30). It shows itself in the "bestial" vices of gluttony, 
drunkenness and wildness (Ak 6:26-27) and in the crude vices of brutality 
and cruelty toward other human beings (Ak 6:33), but also equally, or per-
haps to an even greater extent, in the better concealed "civilized" vices, 
engendered by jealousy and rivalry between human beings, such as envy, 
deceitfulness, ingratitude, and malicious gloating over the misfortunes of 
others (Ak 6:27, 33-34). 
Since the incentives that we tend to prefer to moral ones come from 
our natural inclinations, it might be thought that in the struggle between 
good and evil, the enemy for Kant is natural desire as such. But this would 
certainly not follow, since evil on Kant's account of it does not lie in either 
the fact or the particular content of natural inclinations but rather in our 
tendency to give them greater motivational weight than they rationally 
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deserve. Kant sees things this way too, since he is quite explicit, moreover, 
in maintaining that natural inclinations are in themselves good. He takes 
the Stoics to task for viewing the moral struggle as a contest between rea-
son and natural desire: "Those valiant men mistook their enemy, who is 
not to be sought in the natural inclinations, which merely lack discipline 
and openly display themselves unconcealed to everyone's consciousness, 
but is rather as it were an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason 
and is hence all the more dangerous" (Ak 6:57). 
Kant distinguishes three "predispositions" in human nature: (1) "ani-
mality," the source of our natural desires relating to the survival of the 
individual and the species, and to our sociability; (2) "humanity," the 
ground of our capacity to set ends according to reason and to take the sum 
of our inclinations as a comprehensive end under the name of "happiness"; 
and (3) "personality," the ability to give and obey laws through reason 
alone, hence the ground of our moral accountability (Ak 6:26). All are in 
themselves good, but two of them are also incapable of being the source of 
evil. Personality cannot be, since for it the moral law alone is an incentive, 
and animality, though it can have vices "grafted onto it", cannot be the 
source of these vices because it has to do solely with instinctive desires, not 
with comparison between incentives and the choice of one over another, in 
which evil consists. The source of evil, therefore, must lie in our predisposi-
tion to humanity, which contains "a self-love which is physical and yet 
involves comparison (for which reason is required)" (Ak 6:27). The reason 
involved in our humanity is "comparative," however, not only in the way 
it treats desires (uniting them into a comprehensive end of happiness, and 
choosing to satisfy one rather than another) but also in the way it regards 
the self of the rational being who makes such choices and pursues happi-
ness: "that is, only in comparison with others does one judge oneself 
happy or unhappy. Out of this self-love originates the inclination to gain 
worth in the opinion of others" (Ak 6:27). Originally, and innocently, this is 
merely a desire to be equal to others, but our anxiety that others may seek 
an ascendancy over us turns it gradually into "an unjust desire to acquire 
superiority for oneself over others. Upon this, namely, upon jmlousy and 
rivalry, can be grafted the greatest vices of secret or open hostility to all 
whom we consider alien to us" (Ak 6:27). Our desire to be happy, therefore 
- to form the idea of a comprehensive good, encompassing all our inclina-
tions - is a product of rational humanity, not of animal nature; and funda-
mentally its rationale is to assist us in comparing ourselves to others, 
where the comparison is motivated by a competitive desire to be worth 
more than they are, in their eyes and therefore in our own. 
Kant thinks nature uses this natural antagonism between human 
beings to prod us to develop the faculties of our species (Ak 6:27). This 
Kant calls our "unsociable sociability" (Ak 8:20-22). It makes us sociable 
creatures, insofar as we need the comparison with others, and their opin-
ion of our self-worth, as a measure of our own well-being, but at the same 
time it is an unsociable tendency, since it leads us to seek an unjust superi-
ority over others who, as rational beings, are really our equals. From a 
moral standpoint, therefore, unsociable sociability is identical to a propen-
sity to evil. For the moral law tells us in effect that all human beings are of 
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equal worth as ends in themselves (Ak 4:429), and that we must adopt only 
those ends that can be brought into harmony with others in a "realm" of 
ends (Ak 4:432). But owing to our natural propensity to seek superiority 
over others, we tend to treat our own inclinations as having greater worth 
than those of others; we have, in other words, a propensity to "self-con-
ceit", that is to claim a pre-eminent worth for ourselves prior to our confor-
mity to the moral law, and thus to treat our own inclinations as if they 
were legislative in place of the moral law of reason (Ak 5:73-74). 
Evil for Kant is therefore a product of human reason under the natural 
conditions of its full development, which are found in the social condition. 
The radical evil in human nature is an inevitable accompaniment of the 
development of our rational faculties in society. Kant regards this fact as 
crucial in determining the way we must struggle against evil: 
"The human being is in this perilous state through his own fault; 
hence he is bound at least to apply as much force as he can muster in 
order to extricate himself from it. But how? That is the question. - If 
he searches for the causes and circumstances that draw him into this 
danger and keep him there, he can easily convince himself that they 
do not come his way from his own raw nature, so far as he exists in 
isolation, but rather from the human beings to whom he stands in 
relation or association. It is not the instigation of nature that arouses 
what should properly be called the passions, which wreak such great 
devastation in his originally good predisposition. His needs are but 
limited and his state of mind in providing for them moderate and 
tranquil. He is poor (or considers himself so) only to the extent that 
he is anxious that other human beings will consider him poor and 
despise him for it. Envy, addiction to power, avarice and the malig-
nant inclinations associated with these, assail his nature, which on its 
own is undemanding, as SOOIl as he is among human beings (Ak 6:93-94). 
The need for ethical community. The source of evil, Kant concludes, 
is social. The struggle against it, he concludes, if it is to be effective, must 
therefore also be social.2 Kant thinks that if we imagine the struggle against 
evil individualistically, in the form of isolated individuals each struggling 
heroically against his own inclinations and his own propensity to evil, then 
we are only concocting a recipe for the ignominious defeat of morality. 
Kant makes this anti-individualistic point about the struggle against evil 
both repeatedly and emphatically; it is central to the argument of the last 
two books of the Religion, and it is the note on which he chooses to end his 
textbook on anthropology with which whose publication he ended his 
career. Hence it could, literally and without exaggeration, also be called 
Kant's last word about the human condition as a whole: 
"If no means could be found to establish a union which has for its 
end the prevention of this evil and the promotion of the good in the 
human being, [then] however much the individual human being 
might do to escape from the dominion of this evil, he would still be 
held in incessant danger of relapsing into it" (Ak 6:94). 
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"The highest good cannot be achieved merely by the exertion of the 
single individual toward his own moral perfection, but instead 
requires a union of such individuals into a whole working toward the 
same end - a system of well-disposed human beings, in which and 
through whose unity alone the highest moral good can come to pass" 
(Ak 6:97-98). 
"In working against the [evil] propensity [in human nature] ... our 
will is in general good, but the accomplishment of what we will is 
made more difficult by the fact that the attainment of the end can be 
expected not through the free agreement of individuals, but only 
through the progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and 
toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically combined" 
(Ak 7:333). 
We need, however, to understand a little more clearly why Kant thinks 
an ethical community is needed in the struggle against the evil in human 
nature. His reason is apparently that the origin of evil is social, and there-
fore the struggle against it must take the form of a certain kind of society. 
But taken in one quite natural way, the form of that argument is not at all 
convincing. For if we were to decide that all evil in human nature is due to 
hatred or greed, it would not therefore be natural or reasonable to con-
clude that what we require to combat evil is some special form of hatred or 
greed. Looking at the matter this way, if we decide that evil is social in its 
origin, then the most natural inference from this might be that the struggle 
against it should take the form of self-isolation (the solution of the hermit). 
The hermit's attitude, however, is one that Kant utterly rejects, calling it 
"negative misanthropy" a "flight from humanity" (Ak 27:672). Even if such 
a person wishes others well, his "timidity" or "anthropophobia" 
(Leutescheucn, Anthropophobie) is contrary to the duties of love which we 
have toward other human beings (Ak 6:450). 
The point of Kant's argument that the struggle against evil requires a 
moral community can be seen more clearly if we think about his account of 
evil in greater detail; and this will also give us a clearer indication of the 
nature of the community that is needed. Our unsociable sociability is evil 
because, seeking superiority to others through competing with them for 
such goods as money, honor and power, we set ends that are not only con-
trary to the ends others actually set, but are also in conflict with the very 
possibility of a system of ends that might unite all rational beings on the 
basis of mutual respect for their equal dignity as ends in themselves. 
Directly to combat this tendency consists in adopting ends that do in fact 
agree (or even coincide) with the ends of other human beings, and that do 
so by directly fulfilling the idea of a "realm" in which all ends form an 
organic unity or mutually supporting system. Such a system would consti-
tute a "community" CGemeinschaft) of ends in the technical metaphysical 
sense of that term (as it is used, for example, in the Table of Categories, 
KrV A80/B106). That is, between the ends of rational beings there would 
be a reciprocity, so that the pursuit of each end would advance the pursuit 
of others, and human ends would constitute a self-organizing whole, com-
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bined into a unity like the parts of a living organism. That is what Kant 
means, at the end of the Anthropology, when he speaks of "the progressive 
organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system 
that is cosmopolitically combined" (Ak 7:333). The kind of society we need 
in order to struggle against evil is one that "progressively organizes" all 
human beings so that they gradually become a cosmopolitan community 
of this kind. In the Religion, Kant's name for this sort of society is "ethical 
community" (etlzisclzes gemeines Wesen) (Ak 6:94). 
Several things follow directly from the fundamental nature of ethical 
community. First, such a community cannot be conceived on the model of a 
juridical commonwealth or political state, whose function is to protect the 
right of human beings through coercion. A juridical community or political 
state determines which actions we may rightfully perform, and it protects 
the right by guaranteeing their performance through the use of external 
force. The state's rightful power extends only to compelling me by force to 
restrict my actions so that they are consistent with everyone else's freedom 
according to universal law (Ak 6:230). A juridical community cannot deter-
mine the ends set by human beings, because setting ends is an act of free-
dom; and for it to attempt to do so would even be contrary to the right it is 
supposed to protect. The closest the state could come to making me adopt an 
end would be to compel me to perform actions that serve the ends adopted 
by someone else (i.e. the state's despotic ruler); and to do that would be con-
trary to the right of the state, since it would violate my right as a free and 
rational being. It follows that membership and participation in an ethical 
community must always be entirely voluntary, never subject to external 
compulsion of any kind (Ak 6:94-95). 
Second, since the aim of ethical community is the combination of all 
human beings into a single system or realm of ends, the ethical community 
cannot be subject to any sort of limitation as to its extent, as by restricting it to 
people who live in a certain geographical area or belong to a specific race or 
heredity. For the same reason, it may not bind itself to any specific practices 
or creeds that would exclude part of the human race from belonging to it. 
This means, thirdly, that it can recognize only ends and motivations 
that are ethical (deriving from laws of reason, which are in their concept 
freely yet universally binding). And that entails, fourthly, that the constitu-
tion of this community (the principles of its union) must be unchangeable, 
which requires at the same time that the rules of its administration must 
remain completely flexible and open to constant modification in order to 
reflect the free, rational judgment of its members and in order to enable it 
to pursue the end of progressively including more and more of the human 
race, since its members of necessity include in principle all rational beings 
without exception. 
Kant organizes these four features of the ethical community in accor-
dance with the four headings of his table of categories (KrV A80/BI06): 
Quantity (of the community itself): Unity, guaranteed by the univer-
sality of its extent 
Quality (of the incentives motivating membership in it): Purity, 
depending solely on moral incentives of reason 
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Relation (between its members): Freedom, admitting no coercive gov-
ernment either by a juridical state or by a class of officials within the 
ethical community itself 
Modality: Unchangeableness (of its constitution), but freedom and 
openness of its mode of administration (Ak 6:101-102). 
Ethical community and religion. We are now in a position to use 
Kant's conception of ethical community to solve the problems about his 
concept of religion that earlier perplexed us. 
We wondered, to begin with, why Kant thinks that we should regard 
our duties as divine commands. The answer to this lies in a thesis he holds 
about the ethical community, namely, that it is best conceived as "a people 
of God" under pure moral laws of virtue (Ak 6:99). Kant distinguishes the 
legislator of a law, the one who issues a command and may attach positive 
or negative sanctions to it, from the law's author, the one whose will impos-
es the obligation to obey it. In these terms, Kant thinks only the idea of the 
rational will of every rational being as such can be conceived as its author 
(Ak 4: 431,448); but that if the moral law is to be regarded as a public law, 
binding on an actual community of human beings, then God's will is the 
only one fittingly regarded as its legislator (Ak 6:227; 6:99). For (as required 
by the "quality" criterion of the ethical community) only this will is pure or 
holy, and universal in its extent. In the case of a juridical community, it is 
permissible and even necessary to think of the combined will of the citi-
zens as the legislator; but a fallible and contingently restricted will of this 
kind would be inappropriate for a moral community. We should regard 
our duties as divine commands, therefore, because (and to the extent that) 
we ought to view ourselves as members of an ethical community, whose 
legislator is God. 
The ethical community must be open even to agnostics, because Kant 
holds that no satisfactory theoretical proofs either of the existence or the 
nonexistence of a Deity can ever be given, and if membership in the moral 
community is to be truly universal, it has to extend at least to all those 
whose beliefs fall within the range of belief consistent with the state of the 
possible theoretical evidence. Moreover, even an agnostic is capable of 
forming the concept of God, and of recognizing the will of such a being as 
an appropriate legislator for the moral law when it is regarded as the law 
of a living human community. Thinking of the moral law as commanded 
by a (possible or actual) God whose free, moral sovereignty unites people 
in a universal human society is the best way for me to think of moral laws 
as having public recognition, and myself as belonging with others to an 
ethical community which is united by that recognition. 
We were also puzzled by the fact that Kant links our conception of 
duties as divine commands to our pursuit of the highest good (summum 
bonum), as the sum-total of all moral ends. We wondered why Kant thinks 
we need to regard ourselves as pursuing such an all-encompassing, uni-
versal end, at all, and also what role this pursuit was supposed to play in 
religion (the subjective recognition of all duties as divine commands). Now 
we see that what is fundamental to the ethical community is the fact that 
human beings should pursue in common a set of ends that are systemati-
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cally united into a "cosmopolitical combination" or "realm", that is, an 
organic unity. When we try to think of this organic unity of all rational 
ends as a single end, what we are thinking of is just the highest good (sum-
mum bonum). Kant thinks we are bound to be assailed by doubts concern-
ing the real possibility of ever achieving this end, but that we have an 
answer to such doubts in the form of a faith in God as a supreme legislator 
and governor of the world, through whose highest knowledge, absolute 
power and perfect will the highest good is possible. Kant's conception of 
the highest good as perfect morality or virtue combined with happiness 
proportionate to it is, admittedly, very abstract. But this is because it is 
merely the general idea of the unity of all ends on which all rational beings 
can agree. Even agnostics can join in pursuit of it, and hopes for its achieve-
ment even provide them with subjective or moral grounds for believing in 
God (though such moral arguments constitute no theoretical evidence in 
favor of such belief). 
Our worry that Kant's conception of religion is uncomfortably legalis-
tic can also be addressed. Kant conceives religion this way because, follow-
ing much theological tradition, he thinks of God as a moral legislator, and 
of the ethical community as like a political community in being bound 
together by public recognition of a common legislation. But he is very 
clear that the ethical community differs decisively from any political com-
munity in that membership in it must be wholly free and voluntary, and 
the only incentives to obey its laws must be purely moral, not externally 
coercive. For this reason, there is no room in the moral community as Kant 
conceives it for a religious hierarchy of any kind, or even any form of gov-
ernment (whether monarchical, aristocratic or democratic) (Ak 6:991-100). 
"It could best of all be likened to the constitution of a household (a 
family) under a common though invisible moral father, whose holy 
son, who knows the father's will and yet stands in blood relation 
with all the members of the family, takes his father's place by making 
the other members better acquainted with his will; these therefore 
honor the father in him and thus enter into a free, universal and 
enduring union of hearts" (Ak 6:102). 
Though Kant does not make this explicit, it is arguable that an even 
better analogy for the ethical community in Kantian ethical theory than the 
family would be friendship. For in friendship, people achieve trust and inti-
macy with one another through sharing their ends, and friends (according 
to Kant) even abandon the private end of their own happiness for the sake 
of a common or shared end in which the happiness of the friends is swal-
lowed up (Ak 6: 469-473, 27:423). Friendship and religion also have this in 
common: friendship and the ethical community are the only non-juridical 
social relationships into which Kant says we have an ethical duty to enter.3 
The ethical community and the church. Kant's conception of the ethi-
cal community is obviously modeled on organized religion, and especially 
on the Christian church. More than this, Kant believes that (owing to a cer-
tain weakness of human nature) it is impossible for people directly to form 
a pure ethical community, but they must rather reach such a community 
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through "ecclesiastical faiths" which are originally very different in spirit 
and conduct from pure religious faith, and approximate to a genuine ethi-
cal community only through a long process of historical progress, enlight-
enment and reform. 
Ecclesiastical faiths are typically based on a scriptural authority, 
guarded and interpreted by special scholars and a priestly hierarchy (Ak 
6:100-103). Their "priestcraft" (Pfaffcntum) rules over people's minds by a 
variety of ignominious means - superstitious fears, enthusiastic preten-
sions to mystical insight or empirical divine revelation, fetishistic attempts 
to invoke divine favor or aid through petitionary prayers or other forms of 
pretended magic and sorcery, and the "counterfeit service" (Afterdicl1st) of 
God through all sorts of morally indifferent rites and statutory observances 
(A 6:151-202). Kant looks forward to a time when the kernel of true religion 
will outgrow this empirical shell, lay aside its superstitious and fetishistic 
trappings, abolish "the humiliating distinction between laity and clergy", 
and approach the condition of a genuine ethical community, which (in 
Kant's view) it is the appointed historical task for organized religion some-
day to become (Ak 6:115-137). 
Since Kant's fundamental conception of the human condition is that 
we are a species of rational beings destined to struggle in history against 
our innate propensity to evil, and since for Kant the ethical community is 
conceived as the indispensable focal point for this struggle, it is virtually 
impossible to overestimate the importance of organized religion in Kant's 
scheme of things. We also miss one of the main conceptions of Kantian 
ethics if we fail to appreciate how vital ethical community is to its concep-
tion of the moral life. Kantian ethics is fundamentally misconceived when 
it portrayed only as a morality of cold duty and dessicated individuals 
struggling stoically against their natural desires. We take a step in the right 
direction when, with John Rawls, we see it "not as a morality of austere 
command but an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem.'" But we still 
miss the heart of it if we do not appreciate that the fundamental ideal of 
Kantian ethics is that of a universal community of free beings in which all 
are recognized and treated as equals and all work together toward human 
dignity and happiness as a single shared or collective end. 
The Enlightenment view of religion - and what it means that we fail 
to understand it. Kant therefore is the first to admit (or even to proclaim) 
that the ethical community which grounds his conception of religion is 
very different from organized religion as it has ever existed. But here it 
will be instructive to compare Kant's conception of organized religion and 
its role in human history with his conception of the political state and its 
historical role. Kant's model in the real world for the community whose 
task it is to protect the right of persons is the juridical community or politi-
cal state. He recognizes that no existing state comes very close to fulfilling 
the rational idea of a juridical community, and in fact that most states are 
themselves among the chief perpetrators of injustice and violators of 
human rights. But he hopes that as people become more enlightened, exist-
ing states will shed the defects that now make them unjust, and over time 
that they will gradually come to approximate that idea. For Kant, the only 
political constitution that is really consistent with the idea of right is a 
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republican one (Ak 8:349-350 and note). Most states in his time, including 
the one in which he lived, were fundamentally different from this. But he 
thinks that even a state whose constitution is not republican can come to 
govern in the spirit of a republic, and over time it may even evolve into a 
republican form of government. Kant looks forward to the time when there 
will be a wide consensus among the members of the human race that no 
state can be legitimate unless it fully protects the rights of its citizens, and 
that the only truly satisfactory political constitution is a republican one. 
Looking back over the last two hundred years, I think we must admit that 
Kant's political hopes were not unreasonable; indeed, I think we have to be 
impressed with them as not only remarkably prescient, but even as hopes 
that decent people everywhere have come to share. 
Analogously, Kant's model in the real world for the ethical community 
is the church, or organized religion. Organized religion is to our historical 
hopes for the moral improvement of the human race what the political 
state is to our hope to live with other human beings on terms of safety, 
peace, freedom and justice. Yet perhaps it is hard for us to take the analo-
gy seriously, because political institutions and our demands on them have 
evolved in the direction Kant had hoped they would, whereas religious 
institutions have not. On the contrary, nineteenth and twentieth century 
religion has often seen itself as engaged in a battle to preserve reverence for 
tradition, ethnic diversity and a sense of the transcendent and mysterious 
in human life against enlightenment rationalism, universalist and human-
ist morality, and a liberal, cosmopolitan society, that it blames for the root-
lessness, disorder and moral degeneracy of modern life. 
But we must not forget that the Enlightenment, especially in Germany, 
was much more a religious than a political movement, and a movement that 
it regarded as coming from within religion, not as a secularism arrayed 
against it. Until we are able to recapture the perspective on history and reli-
gion represented by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, we will be unable 
to understand what the Enlightenment was; we will be unable to grasp what 
its true aims were, and we will be unable to estimate, or even properly to see 
at all, the extent of its successes and failures - or, as I would prefer to put it, 
we will be unable to see how far humanity in the last two centuries has been 
impoverished by its failure to realize the ideals of the Enlightenment. 
There are many in our century who have celebrated the failure of the 
Enlightenment view of religion, regarding it as shallow and unspiritual, 
and complacent in the thought that religious thinking and practice has left 
it behind forever. In the past twenty years, there have also been many who 
celebrate the failure of socialism in a similar spirit. Sometimes these 
rejoicers are even the same people, as well they should be, since the histori-
cal hopes whose defeat they are welcoming have a great deal in common. 
As someone who still cherishes those hopes, I confess I am torn between 
pitying and being furious with those who are quick to bury them, but I am 
uncertain whether either attitude is healthy. I am entirely certain, however, 
that the future of the human race will be bleak indeed as long as it is left in 
the hands of people who think as they do. 
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(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), abbreviated as 'Ak'. Volume:page numbers 
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Immanuel Kant. The one exception to this, both in this paper and in the 
Cambridge Edition, is the Critique of Pure Reason, which will be cited by AlB 
page numbers (and abbreviated as 'KrY'). 
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Community: An Inquiry into the Religious Implications of the Highest Good," 
in P. Rossi and M. Wreen (eds.) Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 113-131. 
3. See Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), Chapter 9, § 4.3. 
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971), p. 256. 
